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MORTGAGES
TRANSFEREE'S ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE DEBT - ACCEPT-
ANCE BY MORTGAGEE - RESCISSION OF ASSUMPTION
In July, 1926, D. M. Herrold and his wife executed their promis-
sory note for $15,000 to The Central Savings Bank payable one year
from date and secured by a real-estate mortgage. The bank assigned
the note and mortgage to Emma Anderson but continued to act as her
agent in collecting rent. She instructed the bank to collect the debt at
maturity. Subsequently, but before the note had matured, she was
informed by the bank that Herrold and his wife had conveyed the
premises to E. M. Brickell and M. P. Kirchhofer and as part of the
consideration therefor the grantee expressly assumed and agreed to pay
the mortgage debt. Mrs. Anderson instructed the bank to investigate
the financial responsibility of both grantees. After being satisfied with
the report, she instructed the bank to let the loan stand at maturity and
continue to accept interest only. In January, 1928, Brickell and Kirch-
hofer conveyed the premises to D. M. Herrold, the original mortgagor,
who again assumed the mortgage. Herrold, with his wife joining, again
conveyed and subsequently several other conveyances followed, in each
of which the grantee assumed the payment of the debt. The last grantee
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and the property was
sold to Mrs. Anderson at a public sale for $io,ooo. This action was
brought against all the grantees to recover a deficiency judgment.
Brickell and Kirchhofer were the only defendants who filed an answer.
Their defense was that there had been no adoption or acceptance by
the plaintiff of their agreement to assume the debt prior to the time of
their conveyance to Herrold. This, they contended, amounted to a
rescission of the covenant to assume the mortgage. The common pleas
court of Stark County held, however, that the plaintiff-mortgagee
should recover the deficiency from Brickell and Kirchhofer. Anderson
v. Herrold, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 7 Ohio Op. 447 (1936).
It is a well established rule in most jurisdictions that where a pur-
chaser of mortgaged realty assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage
debt he becomes personally liable for the debt. Note, 21 A.L.R. 446
(1922); Walser, Jdmr. v. Farmers Trust Co., 126 Ohio St. 367,
185 N.E. 535 (1933)- Contra, Prentice v. Brimhall, 123 Mass. 291
(1877). This assumption may be implied or express. Hawthorne Val-
ley Co. v. Investment Co., 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 422 (1931). If the
promise is oral it does not fall within the Statute of Frauds. See, Society
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of Friends v. Haines, 47 Ohio St. 423, 25 N.E. ii 9 (189o). The
grantee is not personally liable, however, where the land is conveyed to
him merely subject to the mortgage. As against him the mortgagee
must look to the land alone. Ryan v. Building and Loan Go., 29 Ohio
App. 476, 163 N.E. 719 (1928). Some states, by statute, limit the
liability of the grantee to the grantor but permit the mortgagee to
bring an action in the grantor's name for the use of the grantor provided
his consent is obtained. Fisher v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74, 51 Atl. 599
(1902).
In order that the mortgagee may be allowed to recover on these
contracts of assumption it is necessary to overcome two possible objec-
tions: the lack of privity between himself and the grantee, and the
absence of a consideration moving from the mortgagee for the grantee's
promise. Two theories have been recognized in this connection. Some
courts permit recovery on the ground that a suretyship relation is estab-
lished giving the mortgagee-creditor the right of subrogation to any
security held by the mortgagor-surety as against the grantee-principal.
Keller v. 4shford, 133 U.S. 6io, io Sup. Ct. Rep. 494, 33 L. Ed.
667 (1889); Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354 (1876). The
majority, however, employ the theory that the mortgagee is a third party
beneficiary. O'Conner v. O'Conner, 88 Tenn. 76, 12 S.W. 447,
7 L.R.A. 33 (1889); Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, 47 Am. Rep.
467 (1883). Ohio favors this doctrine. See, 8 Cinn. L.R. p. 103, and
Mullin v. Claremont Realty Co., 39 Ohio App. 103, 177 N.E. 226,
34 Ohio L. Rep. 335 (1930)-
Where the mortgagee has not been a party to the transaction the
agreement does not amount to a novation. Both the grantor and the
grantee are liable to the mortgagee. He may sue either or join both as
parties defendant. i Williston, Contracts (i92o), sec. 393. In case
the grantor releases the grantee, or together they rescind their agree-
ment, the mortgagee is likely to protest that such action is impossible
without his consent. Where recovery is based upon the equitable doc-
trine of subrogation the agreement may be rescinded before the mortga-
gee accepts or relies thereon. Fisk v. Wuensch, 115 N.J. Eq. 391, 171
Atl. 174 (1934)- If the doctrine of subrogation is consistently applied,
it would seem that the grantor should be able to release his grantee even
after the mortgagee has accepted the promise. i Williston, Contracts,
sura, sec. 384. But acceptance by the mortgagee and reliance thereon
has generally been held to prevent a rescission as against him. Hubard
v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 110 S.E. 263, 21 A.L.R. 423 (1922). A
voluntary release of the grantee by the mortgagor before acceptance by
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the mortgagee is void where the mortgagor is insolvent. Such an act
amounts to a fraud upon his creditors. Young v. Trustees, 31 N.J. Eq.
290 (1879).
In those jurisdictions relying upon the third party beneficiary theory
there is a split of opinion as to when the right of the mortgagee is per-
fected so as to prevent a rescission. A few courts hold that by virtue of
the agreement itself the mortgagee gets an indefeasible right to hold the
grantee. Bay v. Villiams, I12 Ill. 91, I N.E. 340, 54 Am. Rep. 209
(1884); Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652 (1897).
The majority, however, take the position that the mortgagee must
accept the benefits of the agreement or in some way act in reliance
thereon. Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa 349 (1881); Insurance Co. v.
Jit kn, 125 N.Y. 66o, 26 N.E. 732 (1891). Such a divergence of
views can best be explained by the fact that the majority of the courts
give the mortgagee the status of a creditor beneficiary whose rights are
purely derivative. See Williston, supra, sec. 396, 397, and A.L.I.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 143.
It is not clear just what constitutes a sufficient acceptance. Mere
knowledge without more will not create a vested right. Whiting v.
Gearty, 14 Hun. (N.Y.) 498 (1878). However, some hold that
bringing suit before the rescission is all that is required. The Home v.
Selling, 91 Ore. 428, 179 Pac. 261, 21 A.L.R. 403 (1919). Payment
of principal and interest by the grantee to the mortgagee is sufficient.
Smith v. Kibbe, 104 Kan. 159, 178 Pac. 483, 5 A.L.R. 483 (1919).
Cf. Insurance Co. v. Hastings, oo Ind. 496 (1885). Notice of
acceptance must be given by the mortgagee to the grantee. Carnahan v.
Tousey, 93 Ind. 561 (1882). Contra, Hill v. Holdtke, 1O4 Tex. 594,
142 S.W. 871, 4o L.R.A. (N.S.) 672 (1911).
The position taken by the Ohio courts is set out in the case of Motz
v. Root, 53 Ohio App. 375, 4 N.E. (2d) 99 o , 18 Ohio L. Abs. 377,
7 Ohio Op. 174 (1934), where the court held that the mortgagee's
right is in the nature of an option and he has no right to enforce the
agreement until he has done something to show his assent thereto. In
the Motz case the court also held that receiving interest from the grantee
did not amount to an acceptance, adoption or assent of the grantee's
assumption. In the principal case it would seem that the plaintiff's
insistence that the mortgage debt be collected at maturity when the
premises were held by the mortgagor and the subsequent waiver of such
a demand in reliance upon the grantee's financial responsibility was
sufficient to justify the finding that there was an assent to and reliance
upon the grantee's assumption.
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Where the grantee is still free to rescind, a reconveyance in which
his grantee, the mortgagor, reassumes the mortgage debt has been held
to amount to a valid release of the prior agreement to assume the mort-
gage. Morstain v. Kircher, 19o Minn. 78, 250 N.W. 727 (I933).
In the principal case the court stated that the conveyance from Brickell
and Kirchhofer to Herrold alone did not amount to a rescission since
Herrold and his wife were the original grantors. Such a position can
hardly be justified if the wife joined in the conveyance merely for the
purpose of releasing her right of dower. Simply naming her as grantee
in the deed would give her an interest greater than that which she had
previously conveyed. If the court meant that the right of dower released
by the wife to the grantee must now be reconveyed to her, this could
only be done on the assumption that a third party may have the wife's
dower outstanding even though the fee is in her husband. The release
of the right of dower operates to extinguish and not to transfer an
interest. The releasee does not get an interest, but only the immunity
from the releasor asserting it. See Black v. Kuhlman, 30 Ohio St. 196
(1876). The right of dower cannot be separated from the principal
estate. In re Lingafelter, 104 C.C.A. 38, I81 Fed. 24 (191o), which
affirmed 8 Ohio L. Rep. 230 (1909). If it is correct to assume that
the wife merely released her right of dower it would seem from an
analysis of the effect of the release that the act of reconveyance to the
wife as required by the court would be of no legal significance.
HOBERT H. BusH
NEGLIGENCE
DUTY OF DRIVER OF SCHOOL Bus IN REGARD TO CHILDREN
WHO HAVE JusT LEFT THE CAR
Plaintiff's seven-year-old son and several other children alighted
from the school bus, which the defendant was driving, when it made
its usual stop across the road from his home. Whether the child went
to the front or rear of the bus in order to cross the road, was disputed
by the evidence; but when the bus started up again, the little boy was
run over. The driver had no actual knowledge of the child's proximity
to the bus; but, seeing other children going across the road and no one
in front of the bus, he believed they were all out of the way. The jury
found the defendant not negligent, and a judgment for the plaintiff was
sustiiined in the Court of Appeals. In the syllabus, however, it was laid
down as a matter of law that, "A driver of a school bus, in the exercise
